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MODELING OF COMMERCIAL MARITIME PORT RECOVERABILITY
FROM SECURITY DISRUPTIONS: WORK-IN-PROGRESS
C. Ariel Pinto, Ph.D., Old Dominion University
Wayne K. Talley, Ph.D., Old Dominion University
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Abstract
This article describes active research in commercial
maritime port’s recovery from security disruptions
which explores the synergy of economic and
simulation models in investigating the recoverability of
ports after security incidents. Previous study has
identified decision variables and throughput simulation
models of port operation. However, none of these
models have been utilized to investigate port’s
recovery from a security disruption and in evaluating
recoverability investments. The method of research
includes analysis of recorded disruptions, identification
of impediments to recovery and investment criteria for
recoverability. This article provides managers insight
into including security and continuity of operation in
managing various types of systems.
Introduction
The U.S. Coast Guard has moved aggressively since
9/11 to provide for maritime security – e.g., the
creation of the High Interest Vessel Boarding Program,
the deployment of Coast Guard personnel as “Sea
Marshalls” aboard certain ships entering and leaving
ports, and the establishment of port security zones
around ships and high-risk port facilities.
On November 25, 2002, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was signed into
law and was designed to protect the nation’s ports and
waterways from a terrorist attack. The MTSA is based
upon a risk-based methodology and focuses on those
maritime industry sectors that have higher risks of
incurring transportation security disruptions. The
MTSA requires the establishment of committees in the
nation’s ports to coordinate the activities of port
stakeholders,
e.g.,
shipping
lines,
shippers,
longshoremen, shipping agents, the recreational
boating public and various port-related federal, state
and local agencies. In essence, the focus of the MTSA
is to prevent security disruptions in the maritime
supply chain, i.e., in the movement of maritime cargo
from shipper to consignee, with the emphasis on the
port link of the chain.
The research community has also responded to the
events of 9/11. A number of recent studies have
investigated risk and security in general and in ports
and the supply chain. Leung et al. (2004) emphasized
the importance of a critical infrastructure such as a

bridge to recover from failure incidents. Together with
other properties such as redundancy and robustness,
system recoverability is critical for system-wide risk
management. Harrald et al. (2004) presented a
framework for sustainable port security that includes
port-security prevention (pre-attack) and mitigation
and recovery (consequence) programs. The framework
is based on two perspectives: the causal chain of events
leading to security incident and the system of systems
nature of ports. As such, ports are critical nodes in the
complex economic inter-modal subsystems that move
goods and cargo around the world. For example, a
container facility is tightly coupled with the intermodal rail yard and the tightly scheduled container
vessels.
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) investigated the stresstesting of the supply chain by running exercises based
on what-if scenarios. These exercises identify
subsystems (or links) within the supply chain, the
various risk scenarios the subsystems may experience
and the effects to the overall chain. The study notes
that one of the best defenses against a supply chain
failure is a well-designed and communicated recovery
process.
To date, there have been significant improvements
in securing U.S. ports, i.e., the investigation of ex ante
security disruptions since the events of September 11,
2001. However, there has been little or no investigation
of ex post port security disruptions, i.e., the
recoverability once a security disruption has occurred.
Possibly, this is due to the absence of any major
security-related disruption at U.S. ports.
However, port security disruptions cannot be
prevented with certainty. An optimal port security
disruption prevention and recovery strategy is one that
maximizes the net benefits (i.e., benefits minus costs)
of such a strategy, where the benefits are the cost
savings to the port from the strategy and the costs are
those attributed to the strategy -- thereby providing an
efficient allocation of security-disruption resources
among the competing activities of prevention and
recovery. It is expected that law-makers, policy-makers
and the maritime industry itself in the near future will
place greater emphasis on recovery issues related to
port security disruptions (Maritime and Port Security
Summit, 2004). Thus, a potential high-yield study is
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one that contributes towards the analysis of recovery
strategies after a security disruption.
Specific Aims
The focus of the research is to address port’s recovery
from security disruptions. The highly uncertain nature
of security disruptions and the commercial orientation
of maritime ports make this topic well suited from the
fields of economics, logistics, and risk modeling,
assessment, and management.
The particular aims of this research are embodied
in a set of questions that will provide direction to
research activities in a port’s recovery from security
disruptions. These questions are:
- What are the potential security disruptions to a
port?
- What are the impediments to recoverability?
- How can we analyze recovery strategies?
Accidental disruptions. Recovery strategies from any
type of disruption depend highly on specific
characteristics of the disruption, and are designed
based on experience and analysis of event records.
However, there has never been any recorded major
security incident in a commercial port in the U.S. As
such, describing a security disruption to a port is not a
trivial exercise but will require an analysis of nonsecurity related disruptions and an extension of the
analysis to potential security-disruption scenarios.
An investigation of port accidents in 95 countries
can help classify such accidents by type, origin and
cause (Darbra and Casal 2004), and location (Ronza et
al. 2003). The origins of the accidents are (a) transport
of cargo (56.5%), (b) loading and unloading operations
(14.9%), and (c) other origins (process plant, storage,
waste and warehouse facilities) (28.6%). Among
accidents originating from the transport of cargo,
majority (65%) involve ocean-going vessels’
movements in and out of port and ship maneuvering
within port, followed by pipeline accidents (12%). The
causes of the accidents were collision between ships or
between a ship and dry land or between truck and rail
vehicles (46%), mechanical failures (18.1%), Human
error (15.9%), and external causes such as high winds
and fires (17.0%).
Accidents can also be classified in terms of types
such as releases and loss of containment (51%), fires
(29%), and explosions (17%); and in terms of its
location of occurrence such as the sea during approach
and maneuver (40%), on land during storage, process
and transport (21%), and at a sea-land interface during
loading/unloading and maintenance (39%). The most
common types of substances involved in port accidents
are crude oil and other oil products. Port accidents that
involve the handling and temporary storage of

hazardous cargo in port areas originate from the nature
of port activities – e.g., hardware failures of ship,
inland and loading/unloading equipment and external
events such as bad weather (Christou, 1999).
Potential security disruptions. Obviously, there are
security disruptions that are not aptly represented by
the accidents described above. In particularly, possible
terrorism related disruptions such as nuclear attacks,
poison gas attacks, dirty bomb explosions, or
commandeered container trucks and ships have not
been recorded yet. Using decomposition to facilitate
the analysis of possible security disruptions to a port
leads to three subsystems of analysis: physical security,
information or cyber security, and personnel security,
as suggested by Roberts (2004) as shown in Exhibit 2.
These three subsystems provide technologist, security
experts, and system analysts possible approaches to
analyzing the port as a whole.
Exhibit 2. Decomposition of Port for Security
Incident Analysis.
Security disruptions to a Port

Physical security

Information or cyber security

Container transport

Personnel security

Local area network

Transport operators

Barriers

Wide area network

Longshoremen

Equipment

…

Administrative personnel

…

…

Decomposition of a recorded major accident into
critical data elements may be performed using a
method adapted from Lincoln et al. (2004). This
method identifies six key data elements: activity area,
task, contributing factor, precipitating mechanism,
incident event and outcome. These elements are
described in the tables below. This method facilitates
extraction of data from narrative text of recorded
incidents and aids in the development of the potential
incident scenarios.
The following two cases of recorded vessel and
port accidents are decomposed into key data elements:
Case I: Fire aboard the tug Scandia and the
subsequent grounding of the tug and the tank barge
North Cape on moonstone beach south Kingston, Jan
19, 1996.
Summary: On Friday afternoon Jan 19 ,1996 ,the
U S tug Scandia had an engine room fire while towing
the unmanned US tank barge North cape ,4.5 miles Off
point Judith ,Rohde Island .All six crewmembers
abandoned the Scandia and 10-foot 25-knot winds .The
crew was unsuccessful in its attempts to release the
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anchor of the barge ,which rans around and spilled
828,000 gallons of home heating oil, causing the
largest pollution incident in Rohde island history.
Sequence of events:
- Tug Scandia departed bay one enroute to
providence, Rhode Island.
- Scandia was pushing an unmanned barge which
contains 4,074 gallons of heating oil as soon as tug left
New York harbor, it switched from pushing to towing
the North Cape.
- Captain of tug Scandia requested and received a
faxed whether forecast from fleet Whether.
- Friday noon, captain started losing visibility
because of fog.
- He asked chief engineer for check up and chief
engineer found everything fine .
- One of the crewmembers standing in the gallery
and saw smoke coming from top.
- He
Informed
tanker
man
about
smoke.Immdiatly sirens are activated, vessel
monitoring system panel started.
- Crew bought portable (co2) fire extinguisher
but unable to control fire
- Captain
reported
coast
guard
about
uncontrollable fire on vessel and asked for help.
- Captain and crew members’ wore sea suits
- Seaferrer vessel arrived to help crew members
and rescued them
Case 2: - Ramming of the eads bridge by barges in
tow of the M/V Anna Holly with subsequent ramming
and near breakaway of the president casino on the
admiral St. Louis Harbor, Missouri April 4, 1998.
Summary: On April 4, 1998 a tow of M/V Anna
Holly, which was traveling northbound on the
Mississippi river through the St. Louis Harbor, struck
the Missouri-side pier of the center span of the Eads
Bridge. Eight barges broke away and drifted back
through the Missouri span. Three of these barges
drifted toward the president casino on the admiral, a
permanently moored gaming vessel below the bridge
on the Missouri side of the river. The drifting barges
struck the moored admiral, causing most of it’s
mooring lines to break .The admiral then rotated away
from the Missouri riverbank .the captain of Anna Holly
disengaged his vessel from the remaining barges in the
tow and placed the Anna Holly’s bow against the
Admirals bow to hold it against the bank. Fifty people
suffered injuries people were killed and an estimated
damage $11 million.
Sequence of events:
- Anna Holly was traveling from northbound
Mississippi river through St. Louis harbor.
- At about 18:30 got underway from fleeting area
(upstream Minnesota, consists of 12 barges)

- Captain radioed and request for help at coast
guard to assist Anna Holly through bridges.
- Captain asked chief engineer to do routine
check ups Captain directed tow to the right of the eads
bridge center span
- Steering light was not lit, so captain
maneuvered Anna holly close to the middle of the
arched center span and Vessel started to begin slow.
- Anna holly stalled (halted by water current)
- Headway stopped and current caused to drift
sideways towards Missouri side pier of the edge bridge
8 barges broke away the tow
- The drifting barges struck moored caused most
of its mooring lines to break
- Captain disengaged vessel and placed Anna
holly’s bow against Admiral’s bow to hold it against
the bank
Impediments to recovery. Ports are likely to
experience a number of impediments to recovering
from security disruptions. Impediments are factors that
prevent the instantaneous recovery of a port from a
security disruption. The identification of these
impediments can provide critical information in the
effective design and efficient implementation of
recovery strategies.
For any particular security disruption, there can be
more than one possible recovery strategy. Therefore,
there is the need to differentiate among recovery
strategies based on criteria (e.g. cost-benefit,
throughput, etc.) that are acceptable to the various port
stakeholders. This is particularly true in light of scarce
resources.
Typical concept of recovery pertains to activities
after real incident such as fire or equipment failure.
However, the aversion from security related incidents
and the layered security approach typical of many
critical infrastructures have lead to the heavy use of
technologies for early detection of incidents
(Wolthusen 2001, Chen 2004). Nonetheless, any
detection systems always have the possibility of falsepositive alarms; wherein an apparent security incident
actually turns out to be false-alarms. Thus, there are
two types of recovery activities that will be looked at:
recovery after a true security incident and recovery
after a false alarm.
For a true security incident, expected impediments
to a port’s recoverability include rebuilding port
infrastructure (berths); replacement of port mobile
capital (cranes); federal, state and local government
regulations; union labor restrictions; and replacement
of inland-carrier infrastructure and mobile capital. The
time required for a port to recover from a major port
infrastructure disruption is in general expected to be
greater than that from a major port mobile capital
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disruption. In general, regulations of federal agencies
are expected to be greater impediments than
regulations from state and local government agencies.
For a false alarm, the expected impediments to a
port’s recoverability will be inherently different from a
true security incident. Instead of structural
impediments as described above, impediments such as
policies set forth by the port operator, the local law
enforcement agencies, and other policy-based
restrictions will be more evident.
Analysis of recovery strategies. Talley (1996)
presented an economic model of port operation which
identifies performance indicators for evaluating port's
performance with respect to its economic objective
over time. It considers demand functions for the port's
throughputs; prices charged for various services;
opportunity costs incurred by ocean carriers, inland
carriers and shippers; port production functions; port
resource functions; and the costs of port resources. The
model uses economic objective that maximizes annual
throughput subject to a profit constraint, equal to zero
for a public port and some positive value for a private
port.
Some of the port performance indicators include:
ship and vehicle loading and unloading service rates by
type of cargo; port channel accessibility and reliability;
port berth accessibility and reliability; entrance and
departure gate reliability; probabilities of ship, vehicle,
and cargo damage in port; and probabilities of ship,
vehicle, and cargo loss (or theft) in port. With these
performance indicators, port management can evaluate
the performance of specific services or service areas
(e.g., the dock, gates and the port channel) of the port,
thereby detecting where performance within the port
has been improving or declining over time.
This model will be very useful for the analysis of
security disruption if coupled with a throughput model
of port operation during recovery. There are several
recent throughput model of port operation: Leathrum et
al. (2004) describes a simulation of port operation for
military purposes; Luo and Grigalunas (2003)
suggested a spatial-economic approach to modeling a
port; and Demirci (2003) suggested a simulation of
additional investment to port operation. However, none
of these models clearly address the economics of
recoverability
Preliminary Conclusion
The primary challenge of the research during the
preliminary phases is the lack of information on
security disruptions and recoverability in port
operation. Nonetheless, records of accidental
disruptions have been deemed very valuable in creating
potential security disruptions. These records are also

very valuable in identifying impediments to
recoverability. Disruption due to false alarms is
neglected in previous studies but may prove to be
important for the case at hand. Lastly, models for
analyzing port operation, both economic and
throughput abounds. However, more detailed
examination of the models is needed to determine their
suitability for analyzing recoverability issues.
Overall, this article summarizes possible approach
to including security and continuity of operation into
the management of various types of systems.
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